The Default Risk Charge approach to regulatory risk measurement processes by DI PERSIO, Luca et al.
The Default Risk Charge approach to regulatory
risk measurement processes
Bonollo, Michele - IMT Lucca
michele.bonollo@imtlucca.it
Di Persio, Luca - Dept. Computer Science - UniVr
luca.dipersio@univr.it
Prezioso, Luca - UniTn-UniVr-Paris Diderot
luca.prezioso@unitn.it
Abstract
In the present paper we consider the Default Risk Charge (DRC) mea-
sure as an eﬀective alternative to the Incremental Risk charge (IRC) one,
proposing its implementation by a quasi exhaustive-heuristic algorithm to
determine the minimum capital requested to a bank facing the market risk
associated to portfolios based on assets emitted by several ﬁnancial agents.
While most of the banks use the Monte Carlo simulation approach and the
empirical quantile to estimate this risk measure, we provide new compu-
tational approaches, exhaustive or heuristic, currently becoming feasible
because of both the new regulation and to the high speed - low cost tech-
nology available nowadays. Concrete algorithms and numerical examples
are provided to illustrate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed techniques.
Keywords: Default Risk Charge, Incremental Risk Charge,
Quasi Exhaustive-Heuristic Algorithms
AMS classiﬁcation: 91G40, 91G60, 91B70, 65C20, 60H30, 60H35
1 Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis obliged the authorities to improve in a dramatic context the
banking regulation about the risk management processes and the related capital
requirements. The new rules along with the awareness about the weakness of the
current practices implied a new exciting research era in the risk management
ﬁeld, covering the whole end to end process, from new previously forgotten
risk sources (systemic risk, liquidity risk, etc) to the attempt to quantify the
model risk, to the algorithmic eﬀort in order to get faster, granular, reliable risk
measures, according to the best reporting standard, such as auditability, drill
down features and so on. In this wide scenario, one of the challenging tasks is to
capture the credit risk of the ﬁnancial instruments, hence removing the classical
old boundary where only for the banking book instruments, namely mortgages
and loans, the credit risk was measured, while for the ﬁnancial instruments in
the trading book the credit risk calculation was not requested. In fact, it was
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prescribed only within the so called Basel 2.5 regulation established starting
from 2011, see, e.g., [5], for further details.
The regulation path to this uniﬁed view has not yet been completed, but
a new relevant step has been developed in the last 2 years with the new Basel
framework for the market risk. The new regulation and the new capital charges
for the default risk of the trading book portfolio permit to evaluate some al-
ternative computational tools, that can be compared to the usual Monte Carlo
approach (MC from now on) used in this area. The paper is organized as follows:
• Section 2 describes in a self consistent style the ﬁnancial context and the
main objective of the work;
• Section 3 introduces the mathematical framework underlying the ﬁnancial
settings,
• Section 4, besides containing the outline of the usual model for the default
risk calculation, describes the proposal of a quasi exhaustive-heuristic al-
gorithm along with its set-up for real cases.
2 The ﬁnancial context and goal of the work
Since the risk management is a vast ﬁeld, enriched by a large amount of diﬀer-
ent applications, spanning from pure practitioners' ones to more theoretically
oriented subjects, we have provided some references to avoid any possible mis-
understanding concerning both the main goal characterizing the present work
and the general context within which it has been considered.
First of all, let us underline that we can distinguish two main diﬀerent paths
in the risk management history. The ﬁrst one is the scientiﬁc risk management,
namely the whole set of models, and mathematical techniques developed by
both the scientiﬁc and the professional community. Such models are often used
by banks, according to internal scrutiny procedures mainly aiming at adapting
them to real scenarios and contingent decisions.
The second path is constituted by the so called regulatory risk management,
which is nothing but the set of rules the banks are requested to apply to mea-
sure their risks. The latter point is strictly linked to the banks' obligation to
have enough capital to prevent them from huge losses. In this direction, a fun-
damental regulatory framework is the one represented by the Basel committee
on Banking Supervision, or BCBS for brevity. BCBS outlines and updates for
each topic the proper framework, then each country adapts them to build their
actual regulation, taking care to respect some general not negotiable ﬁnancial
constraints.
The two paths meet and interact, very frequently. Typically, new techniques
and models are accepted in the general regulation framework, provided there
exists a robust awareness about them.
A milestone example is represented by the competition between the Value at
Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES). The VaR was adopted as the oﬃcial
market risk measure in 1996 by BCBS, see, e.g., [3]. Then, the academic com-
munity pointed out its drawbacks, such as the lack of sub-additivity property,
see, e.g., [1, 2]. Nevertheless, such risk measure has been adopted so far and is
going to be revised within the incoming Fundamental Review of Trading Book
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(FRTB) framework forecasted to enter in force only from 2022, when the VaR
will be replaced by the ES, see [7], for further details. In this scenario, our work
has been mainly focused to consider the credit risk in the trading book, namely
to consider the risk associated to a portfolio of ﬁnancial instruments held by
the banks, such as bonds and equities. Even if the credit risk ﬁeld is a very
large area, it is possible to split it in two main research areas. The ﬁrst one is
represented by the development and analysis of suitable default models for each
counterparty, along with the estimation of related default probabilities. The
second major theme is the so called portfolio credit risk which, roughly speak-
ing, aims to optimize the way to collect each debtor's risk to obtain a consistent
risk measure for the whole portfolio. The latter implies a diﬃcult point to be
solved, namely how to properly infer the default correlations among diﬀerent
debtors that have not yet been observed at the calculation date. Let us recall
that, concerning the default probabilities evaluation, the most celebrated con-
tributions are the structural models by Merton, see [22], while, to what concerns
the portfolio credit risk, a fundamental seminal work dates back to the Vasiceck
contributions, see [27]. The banking industry has tried to exploit these ﬁrst
scientiﬁc contributions, working on their mathematical peculiarities, to develop
more eﬀective calculation processes, as in the case of the binomial-based model
by Credit Suisse and the Credit Metrics model, for further details see [13], resp.
[24]. The embedding of previously mentioned developments within the Credit
Risk general framework started in in 2006, when the Basel 2 regulation admit-
ted the statistical models to measure the credit risk of the portfolio. Until that
date, only the standard models where allowed, which implied to consider a set
of grids of coeﬃcients, each of which applied to a diﬀerent exposure category.
Along this regulatory line, the statistical model prescribed by the BCBS has
been the Gordy one (2003), also known as the Asymptotic Single Risk Factor
model (ASRF). The ASRF model is characterized as follows: each debtor (i)
has a behavior Yi deﬁned by
Yi = bi ·X +
√
q − b2i · wi ,
where wi, X ∼ N(0, 1), with ρ(X,wi) = 0. In particular, X is the single sys-
tematic risk factor and all the debtors depend on it by the factor loading b,
while the speciﬁc features are summarized in the independent Brownian-type
noise represented by wi. The counterparty defaults if Yi is below a threshold K,
given byK = Φ−1(P ), P being the default probability of (i) that is estimated by
other statistical models. We underline that ASRF model is very appealing for
the regulator, in fact, if the credit portfolio has many positions with exposures
amount Ei and it holds the perfect granularity property, i.e.
Ei∑n
j=0Ej
→ 0 ∀i ,
then the VaR of the whole portfolio can be analytically obtained by summing
up the risk contributions coming from each position. It is worth to mention
that, in real markets, the perfect granularity property does not hold perfectly,
nevertheless if the credit portfolio is very large and not much concentrated,
then the analytical VaR formula represents a good approximation. We have to
consider that typical banks' positions belong to two broad categories, namely:
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the banking book and the trading book. While the banking book mostly consists
of classical credit products, such as loans, mortgages and so on, the trading
one is mainly constituted by structured ﬁnancial instruments, such, e.g., bonds,
equities, derivatives. For the sake of simplicity, we do not analyze the accounting
perspective that allows to classify also some ﬁnancial portfolio in the banking
book category, if there is not a trading purpose for those positions. One of the
most important weaknesses of the Basel 2 regulation exactly lies in the banking
vs trading book classiﬁcation challenge. More explicitly, the default risk has to be
measured within the regulatory framework only for the banking book portfolio,
not for the trading book. As an example we consider a portfolio of plain vanilla
bond. Only the interest rate risk, which is referred as the generic risk in the
BCBS language, and the spread risk, or speciﬁc risk from the regulation point of
view, are captured by a 10 day 99% VaR, without any measurement and capital
constraint assignment for the portfolio default risk.
From the 2007-2008 crisis we learned that also the big banking institutions
and large corporates can fail, implying a huge amount of losses in the trading
book portfolio, also because of possible contagion phenomena, see, e.g., [8] and
references therein. These type of losses can not be absorbed by the bank capital,
at least if no provision for the risk has been previously stated. To solve this gap
an updated regulatory directive, namely the Basel 2.5 one, has been developed,
see [6] and [5] for further details, allowing, in particular, for a new risk parameter
called Incremental Risk Charge (IRC).
This new risk measure is a 99.9% VaR with 1 year horizon. It takes into
account both default risk and migration risk, or down grade, and it has been
mainly prescribed for bonds-type instruments. The Basel 2.5 regulation came
into force in 2012, accompanied by a lot of criticisms because of its overreaction
properties that obliged banks to immobilize huge amount of their capital. In
particular, the IRC measure is an example of risks double counting. In fact,
the migration risk captured by the 99.9% 1 year VaR clearly overlaps the old
classical risk measure for the market risk, i.e. the 99% 10 days VaR. Such an
issue generates too high risk ﬁgures, with banks unable to eﬃciently allocate
the requested capital. Therefore, BCBS published an updated version of the
previous regulatory rules, providing the fundamental review of the trading book
(FRTB), see, e.g., [7], which, even if becoming into eﬀect just starting from 2022,
has immediately pushed banks to be compliant with it, by applying its the new
rules in advance within their reporting and limits system as well as to try to
develop properly adapted internal models. Therefore, the FRTB has allowed to
overcome some of the previously present ﬁnancial misunderstandings. The IRC
has been replaced by the Default Risk Charge (DRC).
The main features of DRC are:
• It is still a 99.9% 1 year VaR
• Only default risk is considered, while migration risk is removed
• Equity style positions have to be considered
• The default model must be a 2 systematic factors model, to overcome the
drawbacks of ASRF. In fact, since trading book often consists of a relative
small number of concentrated positions, namely just dozens or hundreds
of debtors, instead of set many thousands, the ASRF proxy could provide
too rough estimates.
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• The default correlations must be jointly estimated, hence taking into con-
sideration both equity prices and spread movements
An excellent review of the FRTB regulation can be found in [20], while the new
DRC challenges are clearly explained in [25]. Within this scenario, we do not
aim to suggest what systematic risk factors have to be selected, how to estimate
the default correlations, how to map illiquid instruments, or what is the proper
proxy to be considered. Instead, in the global DRC calculation work-ﬂow, we
try to innovate in the ﬁnal quantile calculation procedure. In other words,
once the model have been stated, the positions have been classiﬁed and we
know the joint default probability of all the debtors, we want to compare the
classical Montecarlo approach with deterministic exhaustive or near exhaustive
procedures.
It is worth to observe that the more the quantile level is extreme, 99.9% for
DRC, the more the Montecarlo empirical quantile can suﬀer of high variance
estimation error, as outlined, e.g., in [14].
Then a huge number, such as 10 or 100 millions, of heavy simulations are
run by the banks to get convergence of the empirical estimator, implying a high
time consuming procedure which is also not so easy to set-up.
At the best of our knowledge, our analysis innovates the already present
literature on the subject, showing a new proposal that we are conﬁdent can be
a very promising alternative to the existing ones.
3 The mathematical setting
Model for the IRC/DRC measure
To focus on the statistical and algorithmic problem, we skip some of the several
technical details of the regulation, and we simplify a bit the complex model.
Roughly speaking, most of the model for IRC are structural models, where the
default event of each issuer is related to some background risk factors. Moving
from IRC to DRC, the model for the portfolio losses could remain the same,
only the events to be considered are changing.
For a general overview of the structural model á la Merton, see the seminal
paper in [22].
For the practical implementation in the industry, the benchmark model is
the CreditMetrics model, see [24].
For the sake of simplicity we focus now on the most common model in the
banking practice, avoiding too many theoretical deﬁnitions and preliminaries.
Notation
• J : the number of issuers (of bonds, equities, ...) in the trading portfolio.
Usually for medium banks J could be of some dozens, more than one
hundred only for very large banks. Moreover, we have a concentration
eﬀect, e.g. with the top 10 issuers one has a relevant fraction of the whole
portfolio value.
• MtM j : the mark to market, or present value, of the instruments issued by
the j-th issuer, then MtM j =
∑I(j)
i=1 MtM i,j , where I(j) is the number of
instruments hold in the portfolio and issued by issuer j.
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• DP j : the default probability of the issuer j-th.
• Rj : the rating level of the issuer j-th at the evaluation time. Usually (it is
merely a convention) the lower the rating code, lower the default proba-
bility. Usually the ratings are useful tools to group the default probability
levels, hence one can write DP (Rj) instead of DP j to make explicit this
mapping process.
• rr j : the recovery rate for the j-th issuer once the default event happens.
This value is a fraction in the range [0, 1], but usually it is quite close
to 35%, 40% for bond instruments, 0% for equity instruments. In the
practice, we can not have an estimated recovery rate for each issuer, before
it defaults, then the recovery rates are grouped by historical data and
clustering all the default events by sector (ﬁnancial, corporates, govies)
and / or geography. We indicate with s (j) the sector to which the issuer
j belongs, we can write more explicitly rr (sj). The complement to 1 of
the recovery rate is the loss given default (LGD in short), lgd j = 1− rr j .
• Lj : the loss due to the default of the j-th issuer. Here we do not focus
on the joint stochastic dynamics of market (interest rate, forex exchange,
equity prices) and credit (default, spread) risk factors, hence we simply use
the expression Lj = MtM j · lgd j ·Ft, where F is the forward factor over a
time horizon t and is equal to 1 at the default time is the MtM is supposed
not to change signiﬁcantly. Hence here L is not a random variable, but the
loss once the default occurs. Furthermore, as usual from the practitioner's
point of view as well as within the Basel regulation models, we replace the
random loss given default fraction with its expected value LGD. Therefore,
L can be considered as an expected loss, conditioned to the default event.
• RL: number of rating levels.
• PLj (rl) is the proﬁt (or loss) for the holdings in the j-th issuer if its
rating moves from the current level to the level rl = 1, 2, . . . ,RL. Practi-
cally, a further mapping process is performed, and for each combination
(s, rl1, rl2) of rating migration for a given sector s a spread movement is
established, let be ∆spread{s,rl1,rl2}. We stress the fact that, since the
lgd j do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from a j to another, the vector of the losses
Lj may be viewed as almost proportional to the vector of the mark to
markets MtM j .
With the above equipment, we can ﬁnally write the portfolio loss due to the
default events, let LossP
LossP =
∑
Lj · 1D(j),
being 1D(j) the indicator function of the default event. Despite the very compact
expression, the calculation process of the risk ﬁgures (quantile, expected short-
fall, etc.) are very involved, because of the complex parameters estimation pro-
cess one has to set and to maintaining, and for the dependency structure between
the issuers defaults. The IDR measure is deﬁned as VaR (LossP , 99.9%, 1Y ).
If we are interested to the broad proﬁts and losses proﬁle that we could
observe in the portfolio because of the migration events we have
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PLP =
∑
PLj (Rj) .
In the above expression most of the complexity is in the chain of possible mi-
gration events, the associated PL, the dependency between the diﬀerent issuers
migration.
The above quantities are the key point of our application in the next section.
At the end, the random variable PLP is a discrete one. How many possible
outcomes could it have?
Given the J issuers, and given the number RL of rating levels, we have
that the cardinality of the outcomes of the random variable PLP equals RL
J ,
i.e.#{outcomes(PLP )} = RLJ .
Here we are analyzing the issue by a strict cardinality perspective of the
points in the space Ω where the elementary events ωi take place. Of course we
could have diﬀerent events with the same numerical value of PLP or some events
that have very negligible probability. Anyway, with practical cases parameters
it comes out a number of outcomes that can not be dealt satisfactorily in an
exhaustive fashion.
Here exhaustive means that we could theoretically calculate the exact dis-
tribution of the random variable PLp, i.e. its outcomes {xi} and the related
probability masses {qi}, and then to obtain the quantile by properly cutting the
cumulative (discrete) distribution function at a given level.
With J = 20, RL = 10 we have 1020 possible outcomes. Obviously this
cardinality cannot be actually managed due to 3 main reasons:
1. computational, i.e. to calculate all the {qi} probability masses;
2. ordering, i.e. to order the PLP (i) to get the quantile;
3. storage, i.e. to write in a database the whole input-output combinations
for auditability purposes.
But thanks to the IDR new regularization the number of outcomes decreases
dramatically, hence one can wonder if some exact calculation can be performed.
Let us recall that in this case we have only 2J elementary outcomes. With
the above parameters 220 ' 1, 000, 000. Then at least theoretically we can try
to face it by exploiting its feasibility, computational time and so on.
4 Evaluation approaches
In this section we will face our aim to determine the value of the minimum
capital required to stand up to losses due to the 99.9% worst possible scenarios
of issuers defaults with shares in the portfolio considered.
This part will be divided in two main subsections that correspond to the
description of a numeric algorithm for a relatively small portfolio dimension and
the description of a simulation algorithm for a portfolio with larger dimension.
Because of the heuristic approach for the larger dimension portfolio, the second
subsection will be integrated by a statistical comparison.
For both cases it will be considered a portfolio consisting of J issuers; J will
be the dimension of the problem. Practical experience has shown that usually
portfolios satisfy some characteristics on the loss vector L = [L1, L2, . . . , LJ ] and
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on the default probability vector DP = [DP1, DP2, . . . , DPJ ], i.e. the vector
which has as components the default probabilities of single issuers, that are
summarized by the following properties:
• We have an usual concentration eﬀect in the asset allocation (e.g. more
in the govs bonds, less in the corporate bonds). Then we can heuristically
assume that the loss determined by the default of the 10% of the issuers
among the larger ones, should be at least the 90% of the maximum pos-
sible loss in the portfolio,
∑J
j=1 Lj . Here the values 10% and 90% are
an example, and other similar assumptions on the concentration may be
made. As we outlined in section 3, we have that L ≈ c ·MtM, i.e. the 2
vectors have approximatively the same distribution. Hence from now on
we simply use L = (Lj);
• L can be satisfactorily approximated by a Beta distribution, This approx-
imation is justiﬁed since the global loss L =
∑
Li is bounded, which
is coherent with the Beta distribution characteristics and, moreover, by
updating its parameters, the distribution behavior can be adapted to ﬁt
diﬀerent loss shapes. It is also worth to mention that the Beta distribution
is rather popular within ﬁnancial applications to describe the loss given
default quantity, which implies that it is a widely accepted random model
in the credit risk management practice. We would also like to underline
that the loss is the sum of weighted, by the portfolio fractions, loss given
default. From this point of view, one can also consider diﬀerent probability
distribution alternatives, as the Gamma or Log-normal ones, nevertheless
they are more suited for unbounded losses cases, as, e.g., when considering
the operational risk ﬁeld, as pointed out in [23].
• Issuers with greater Lj have a lower default probability DPj , because of
the prudent asset allocation of the bank's portfolio.
• Default probabilities are in the range [0, 10%].
It is worth to mention that such empirical facts admit some exceptions,
nevertheless the above points have some rather intuitive rationale. Typically,
if we look at the bond portfolio of a typical European commercial bank, it is
characterized by long positions with a relevant part of government bonds, and,
in this category, the ﬁrst holding is for the national country bonds with good
tradition, e.g., BTP for Italy, bonos for Spain, bunds for Germany, etc. Moreover,
all the banks have some limits in the asset allocation policies, where some strict
upper bounds are assigned for instruments and issuers with low rating, such as
B, BB, etc. Furthermore, some limits are given also by sector, where corporate
bonds, typically with higher default probability, cannot exceed a given threshold.
Hence we have the double concentration eﬀect mentioned above. As an example,
we exhibit the portfolio composition, as of 2016, December, of one of the largest
Italian banks. For the sake of clarity, here the weights are relative weights, and
the total value of portfolio is about 20 billions AC:
• Numbers of issuers in portfolio: about 90;
• Weight of the ﬁrst bon issuer, or Italian Republic issuer: 84%;
• Weight of the ﬁrst 5 holdings: 91%.
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Figure 1: Plot of the cumulative weight of the bond issuers.
Figure 1 represents the plot of the cumulative weight of the bond issuers. Due to
the huge variety of banks and issuers in the market, there is not a comprehensive
empirical analysis in the literature, but several speciﬁc studies, most of which
have been conducted by central banks and ﬁnancial authorities that have access
to data where generally there is not a granular disclosure, namely the bank
portfolios holdings. A very recent deep analysis can be found in [21].
These portfolio management techniques explain both the concentration ef-
fect and the negative relationships between the PDs values and the exposures
sizes. To this extent, let us recall that the market spread values for bonds can
be misleading in the perception of the default probability, namely for the gov-
ernment bonds. In fact the FRTB regulation strictly prescribes to do not use
the market, risk neutral, PDs implied by the spread, but instead the statistical
real world estimation, see, in [7], the 352 BCBS paper, par.186.(s). Therefore,
the high spread levels and volatilities characterizing some EU countries, where
the banks have the most relevant holdings, do not imply high PDs in the DRC
calculation, namely: the real probabilities are very low, hence matching the
negative relationship principle.
To obtain a vector L satisfying these properties, for each single issuer j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , J} we simulate the values of Lj through a beta distribution f(α, β),
with parameters α = 1/15 and β = 5, of the default probability, DPj , that will
be proportional to its Lj .
In ﬁgure 2 are summarized the simulation steps for L and the default prob-
abilities.
Instead, in ﬁgure 3 we split the range for the loss values in 40 sub-segments
and represented the frequencies of occurrence of 1000 losses Lj , simulated by a
Beta
(
5, 115
)
, and we did the same for the default probabilities DPj , which are
inversely proportional to the value assumed by the correspondent Lj .
Figure 4 represents the scatter plot of J = 200 points of a single portfolio
simulation for the couple (DP , L) to show the tendency of an inverse relation
between the amount of losses and the default probabilities.
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Figure 2: Loss and Default Probability simulation.
Figure 3: Histogram representing the frequency of occurrences of 1000 values of L
and DP. We remark the fact that banks have diﬀerent portfolios from each other, and
that the portfolios are time changing, therefore taking into consideration simulated
portfolios is not less accurate than considering samplings that are relatively small
w.r.t. the wide empiric variety.
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Figure 4: Scatter plot of a single simulation of J = 200 points of the couples (DP , L)
with logarithmic scale for the y-axis.
4.1 Determination of the minimal capital required through
comprehensive exact approach
Let us start from a simple case. We consider a portfolio P consisting in shares of
J = 20 issuers, assuming that the loss vector L and the default probability vector
DP are such that P satisﬁes the properties derived by practical experience.
Since every issuer is associated to a DPj , we can compute the conditional
default probabilities determined by defaults of combinations of issuers. In this
paper we will assume that the issuers are uncorrelated, therefore it is the start-
ing point for further analysis. The reason for this independence assumption on
the issuers is mainly motivated by the fact that this study is meant to empha-
size the calculation procedures and the machine execution eﬀort, instead of the
statistical model that binds the issuers.
Having J = 20 issuers in the considered portfolio, implies that the number
of possible conditional default scenarios is
N = 2J = 1048576,
and if we have n issuers that will default, the number of possible combinations is
given by the binomial coeﬃcient
(
J
n
)
. To each default scenario we can associate
its conditional default probability CDP . For n issuers that will occur default, we
consider the index set I with dimension n such that each element in I represents
the index of a issuer that will face default in the simulated scenario. Then the
indexes for the solvent issuers belong to the set
{1, 2, 3, ..., J} \ I.
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The Conditional Default Probability associated to the index set I is
CDP(I) =
∏
i∈I
DP(i) ·
∏
1≤j≤J
j /∈I
(
1−DP(j)), (1)
and its corresponding loss is
LossP (I) =
∑
i∈I
L(i). (2)
We want to determine the 99.9% worst case, so we sort all the possible LossP
in descending order as elements of the vector LossP
Dec, and the CDP with the
same order as the sorted LossP (I) as elements of the vector CDP
LossP -sort.
Therefore the ﬁrst element of the vector for the reordered LossP
Dec is the loss
determined by the default of every issuer, i.e.
LossP
Dec(1) = LossP
({1, 2, . . . , J})
=
J∑
i=1
L(i),
and the ﬁrst element of the CDPLossP -sort reordered as the LossP
Dec is
CDPLossP -sort(1) =
J∏
i∈1
DP (i).
To provide an example, let us assume that the issuer with lower L is the second
one, then the second element for the sorted LossP
Dec would be the summation
of all the issuers L except the one of the second issuer, and the second element
for the reordered CDPLossP -sort would be
CDPLossP -sort(2) =
J∏
1≤i≤J
i 6=2
DP(i) · (1−DP(2)),
and so on for all the 2J possible scenarios.
The IDR we are searching for is the element of LossP
Dec corresponding to
kˆ − 1, where kˆ is the lower index such that the cumulative probability satisﬁes
kˆ∑
i=1
CDPLossP -sort(i) > 0.1%.
Since CDP is a discrete variable, we can not consider the usual deﬁnition of
quantile of a continue random variable, instead we read the 99.9% quantile of
the discrete variable CDP as the higher index kˆ s.t.
P(Loss ≤ LossPDec(kˆ − 1)) ≤ 99.9%,
where Loss : Ω → R+ is a discrete random variable which takes values ac-
cordingly to (2) for all the possible combinations in Ω = {0, 1}J , where ones
and zeros represent default and non-default for each issuer, e.g. an outcome
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J Time normalized IDR
6 0.073′′ 58.47%
7 0.038′′ 69.97%
8 0.068′′ 69.11%
9 0.141′′ 61.76%
10 0.267′′ 43.02%
11 0.465′′ 97.23%
12 0.910′′ 70.96%
13 1.633′′ 76.83%
14 3.188′′ 80.32%
15 6.22′′ 63.85%
16 12.21′′ 82.01%
17 26′′ 84.21%
18 52′′ 59.4%
19 1′ 45′′ 41.58%
20 3′ 32′′ 59.79%
21 7′ 4′′ 51.56%
22 14′ 2′′ 96.31%
23 27′ 48′′ 80.47%
24 55′ 31′′ 32.60%
25 1h 41′ 41′′ 33.64%
Table 1: Table representing the computation time and the normalized 99.9% IDR
equal to IDR/
∑J
i=1 L(i), later on it will be denoted as y, for portfolios simulated
with diﬀerent dimensions J .
ω ∈ Ω = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1) represents the default of the fourth and seventh is-
suer in a J = 7 dimensional portfolio. Therefore for simplicity of notation we
consider this approximation as the desired percentile, i.e.
IDR(99.9%) = LossP
Dec(kˆ − 1). (3)
In ﬁgure 5 we have summarized the steps for the exact evaluation of the
IDR, i.e. to the LossP corresponding to the 99.9% worst cases.
To conclude the analysis of the deterministic approach, let us underline that
the exact algorithm we have presented, satisfactorily works with low dimension
portfolios and uncorrelated issuers. While, if the dimension J representing the
number of issuers starts to be greater than 30, then the computational eﬀorts
needed to evaluate the IDR for the 99.9% starts to be rather demanding, since
the algorithm complexity grows exponentially in J , i.e. T (J) = O(2J). Table 1
relates the dimension of the simulated portfolios to the amount of time taken
by the algorithm to run using a CPU based on a 2,5 GHz Intel Core i5 unit.
4.2 Determination of the minimal capital required through
heuristic technique HR
As we have seen in the previous subsection, increasing the portfolio dimension
the execution time for the exact algorithm becomes prohibitive. For this reason,
for an higher dimensions we simplify the complexity of the IDR evaluation
problem through an estimate from a regression model. Let us denote as J∗
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Figure 5: Evaluation procedure for the IDR, that corresponds the LossP in to the
99.9% worst cases. For the sake of clarity, let us divide the graph in three main parts:
before the i ≥ 0-cycle, during and after the cycle itself:
1. The initialization of the variables Loss and CDP as vectors with
∑
i∈{0,1,...,J}
(
J
i
)
=
2J elements. Moreover the deﬁnition of some counting variables for the next cycles.
2. Repeat for i = J−1, . . . , 1, 0, then the cycle consists in deﬁning the matrix V whose
rows are the possible combination of i banks failing. Then deﬁne all the elements in
the vector Loss as all the possible losses corresponding to the combination of failing
banks. For each loss, we determine the probability to face this amount of default
deﬁning them as the elements of the vector CDP .
3. Search for the desired percentile and deﬁne it as IDR.
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the higher dimensions in order to mark the diﬀerence between this estimation
problem and the previous one. We also denote as P ∗ the portfolio consisting in
shares of J∗ issuers, and will be referred as Portfolio Target.
Considering n simulated J dimensional portfolios, we estimate the relation-
ship between y, ratio of IDR(99.9%) with respect to the maximum possible
LossP given by default scenarios, i.e.
y =
IDR(99.9%)∑J
i=1 L(i)
, (4)
and two concentration indexes. We remark the fact that y is a relative IDR
which is a dimensionless index. Indeed, the basic idea behind the evaluation of
y is to start estimating the IDR of the Portfolio Target P ∗ through the concen-
tration indexes and then switching to a dimensionless scale w.r.t. its dimension
J∗. To be more precise, supposing that the quantile is a well estimable fraction,
given by the concentration curves of L and DP , we extrapolate the behavior
observed in the lower dimension J < J∗ to adapt it to the Target problem in
dimension J∗. We consider the concentration indexes that measure how the
total LossP and the sum of all the default probabilities are divided through the
issuers. Let us explain how we get these concentration indexes. First of all we
sort the issuers by their losses L. Then, since to each issuer is associated a L
and a DP, from the reordering we obtain two vectors:
1. LInc, which has as elements the L arranged increasingly,
2. DPL-sort, which has as elements the DP corresponding to the losses L
with same index in the vector LInc.
Let us denote by Q
(p)
1 and Q
(p)
2 the concentration indexes for L
Inc and
DPL-sort given by the formulas
Q
(p)
1 =
∑dp·Je
i=1 L
Inc(i)∑J
i=1 L
Inc(i)
, Q
(p)
2 =
∑dp·Je
i=1 DP
L-sort(i)∑J
i=1DP
L-sort(i)
, (5)
where p is the percentage corresponding to the portion of issuers which will
cause a lower loss in the portfolio w.r.t. the other (1− p) J issuers. We remark
the fact that the index Q
(p)
1 represents the ratio of minimum possible loss in
the portfolio
∑J
i=1 Lj that would occur in the case that the portion p of issuers
which would cause the lower loss in the portfolio will face the default event.
Respectively, Q
(p)
2 is the concentration ratio of the default probabilities of the
issuers which would determine lower losses in the portfolio. Table 2 shows the
two concentration indexes Q1 and Q2 corresponding to a simulated portfolio for
every percentage p.
In the regression we consider as regressors the concentration indexes Q
(90%)
1
Q
(75%)
2 , i.e. through linear regression the model would be
y = β0 + β1Q
(90%)
1 + β2Q
(75%)
2 + , (6)
where the slopes β1 and β2 and the intercept β0 are the unknown parameters,
the normalized quantile y is the dependent variable, the rate index, Q1 and Q2
are the independent variables and  represents the estimation error. Namely, the
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p dp · Je Q(p)1 Q(p)2
(0%, 5%] 1 0.0000% 11.64%
(5%, 10%] 2 0.0000% 22.60%
(10%, 15%] 3 0.0000% 33.39%
(15%, 20%] 4 0.0001% 45.12%
(20%, 25%] 5 0.0002% 56.65%
(25%, 30%] 6 0.0003% 64.70%
(30%, 35%] 7 0.0005% 70.12%
(35%, 40%] 8 0.0006% 77.83%
(40%, 45%] 9 0.0008% 82.13%
(45%, 50%] 10 0.0023% 82.24%
(50%, 55%] 11 0.0076% 82.95%
(55%, 60%] 12 0.0438% 87.48%
(60%, 65%] 13 0.18% 89.74%
(65%, 70%] 14 1.16% 93.26%
(70%, 75%] 15 3.51% 94.04%
(75%, 80%] 16 7.79% 95.86%
(80%, 85%] 17 13.60% 97.72%
(85%, 90%] 18 25.85% 97.80%
(90%, 95%] 19 55.24% 99.24%
(95%, 100%] 20 100% 100%
Table 2: Table representing Q
(p)
1 and Q
(p)
2 values corresponding to a simulated J = 20
dimensional portfolio, for every p ratio.
underlying idea is that a general portfolio satisfying the characteristics arising
from practical experience can adequately be represented by these two concen-
tration indexes; and therefore, for high-dimension portfolios, it suﬃces to make
regression on Q
(p1)
1 and Q
(p2)
2 , for proper p1 and p2.
The choice of such a percentage p for Q
(p)
1 is embedded in the hypothesis of
concentration above the construction of L. To select such p we simulated several
curves Q1 : [0, 1] → [0, 1], p 7→ Q(p)1 (as we did in ﬁgure 6) and we considered
the tangent lines Tp¯ to the graph described by Q1 in diﬀerent points p¯ ∈ (0, 1)
Tp¯(x) =
dQ
(p)
1
dp
(x− p¯) + p¯. (7)
In particular we considered the slopes of the tangent lines and it turns out
that for p ∈ (0, 0.85] these slopes were close to zero and too much less than 1,
therefore the variations
∆Q
(p)
1
∆p were exiguous, which means that choosing p¯ = 0.1
or p¯ = 0.7 would result in Q
(p¯)
1 very close to each other; on the contrary for
p¯ ∈ [0.95, 1) the slopes are too conspicuous and therefore diﬀerent simulations
could give values of Q
(p¯)
1 too distant. For these reasons we choose a middle
value p = 0.9, so that Q
(p)
1 would have been appropriate and meaningful for the
regression. We followed the same theory to choose the percentage p for Q
(p)
2 .
This time the only care needed was p not being close to 1 since the issuers with
higher L have very poor DP, so the variations
∆Q
(p)
2
∆p would have been close to
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Figure 6: Plot of the concentration indexes of a simulated portfolio.
zero and the values of the regressors wouldn't have been very signiﬁcant for the
regression.
In ﬁgure 6 are represented the concentration indexes for a portfolio simulated
as explained in ﬁgure 2; the chosen Q90%1 and Q
75%
2 are marked.
A linear regression model could be inappropriate to estimate the rate y. In
fact, it would not consider the upper and lower boundaries, hence, to avoid
predictions outside the interval [0, 1], we apply the Logistic Quantile Regres-
sion(LQR). There are several application of the LQR to systemic risk analysis,
see [26] for a study concerning the forecast of recovery rates. Moreover, LQR is
widely used in many statistical ﬁelds, as, e.g., in Economics, as well as in Ecol-
ogy, Meteorology, Biomedical sciences, etc., see, e.g., [11, 18], and references
therein.
Hence through the logistic formula for the dependent variable y
logit(y) = log
( y
1− y
)
we bound the estimated values between 0 and 1. Inverting the logit function we
get the regression model as
y ∼ 1
1 + exp
(−(β0 + β1Q(90%)1 + β2Q(75%)2 + )) . (8)
We start considering the simulation of n = 50 portfolios composed by shares
of J = 12 diﬀerent issuers.At this ﬁrst introduction level n does not play a spe-
ciﬁc role, we just use n = 50 as it is enough for an estimation of the 2 parameters
in the regression. Each of them is simulated by the procedure explained in the
previous subsection. So we compute n couples of concentration indexes Q
(90%)
1
and Q2,
(75%), and rate indexes y, and through the logit regression model we
estimate the parameters β0, β1 and β2. In ﬁgure 7 are plotted the triplets
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Figure 7: Plot of the logistic regression model and of the data obtained by the simu-
lation of n = 50 portfolios.
(Q
(90%)
1 , Q
(75%)
2 , y) corresponding to the n portfolios, and the regression model.
Once the parameters β0, β1 and β2 are estimated, they can be used to
estimate the value of the rate y∗ corresponding to the 99.9% worst case for the
portfolio P ∗ with dimension J∗ as
y∗ = logit−1
(−β0 − β1Q(90%)∗1 − β2Q(75%)∗2 ), (9)
where Q
(90%)∗
1 and Q
(75%)∗
2 are the concentration indexes for P
∗. Consequently
the estimated Loss for P ∗ is
IDR∗(99.9%) = y∗ ·
J∗∑
i=1
L∗(i), (10)
where L∗(i) is the loss determined by the default of the ith issuer in the portfolio
P ∗.
In ﬁgure 8 through a ﬂow chart are summarized the steps for the HR model
and the estimation of the IDR for P ∗ in the 99.9% worst cases.
Monte Carlo simulation and IDR estimation Let us consider a portfolio
P with J independent issuers. As before, a determined loss value L(j) and a
default probability DP(j) are assigned to each issuer j = 1, . . . , J , see ﬁgure 2 for
the detailed simulation procedure. The Monte Carlo (MC) method consists in
the simulation of N default scenarios which can be summarized by the following
steps:
1. Start simulating a uniform-randomly based matrix U, with values in
[0, 1]J×N , namely each of its elements U(j, n), for j ∈ {1, . . . , J} and
n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, corresponds to the j-th issuer in the n-th scenario;
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Figure 8: Flow chart of the steps for the estimation of the Portfolio Target IDR
in the 99.9% worst cases. Given n, number of regression Portfolio that have to be
simulated, J and J∗ dimension for the regression Portfolios and the Portfolio Target
respectively, and the L∗(j) for every issuer of the Portfolio Target and the DP∗(j),
with j = 1, 2, . . . , J∗.
2. Then, for each scenario n = 1 . . . , N , we have the j-th issuer default as
soon as U(j, n) < DP(j);
3. The loss in the portfolio P , for the n-th simulated scenario, is given by
the sum of the L(j) s.t. U(j, n) < DP(j), i.e.
LossMC(n) =
J∑
j=1
L(j)1{U(j,n)<DP(j)}, for n = 1, . . . , N. (11)
We use the empirical quantile as the MC estimate of the theoretic quantile, i.e.
the estimated IDRMC (99.9%) is the (N/1000)-th greatest LossMC .
By construction, we have that the random variable Loss is s.t.
P
(
Loss ≤ IDR(99.9%)) ≈ 99.9%, (12)
where IDR(99.9%) is the 99.9% percentile that we aimed to estimate. Therefore
the sample p = 99.9% quantile IDRMC (p) satisﬁes the following equation
σˆ2N = Var(IDR
MC ) ≈ p (1− p)
(N + 2) f2(IDR)
+O(1/N2), (13)
with f probability density function (PDF) of Loss, see, e.g., [12]. In ﬁgure 9
is plotted f , the PDF estimated from the simulated data LossMC1 , . . . ,Loss
MC
N ,
with N =1,000,000. The estimation is based on a normal kernel function. We
estimate the conﬁdence interval with 99.9% conﬁdence level as
CIMCN (99.9%) = IDR
MC ± 3.0902 σˆN . (14)
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Figure 9: Estimated PDF of Loss from the MC simulated data represented in the
adjacent frequency histogram.
Comparison between HR Model and Exact Algorithm We consider
J∗ = 18 as the dimension of the portfolio target. Our aim is to compare the
HR model with the exact algorithm and the MC model and see how far is the
prediction for the IDR obtained by the HR from the correct IDR obtained by
the exact algorithm. So we simulate n = 32 regression portfolios with dimension
J = 12 (at the end of this paragraph our choice for n and J will be explained).
The portfolios are simulated as shown in ﬁgure 2, namely they share the
characteristics of beta distributed losses and default probabilities are inversely
related to the correspondent losses. The choices of J∗, n and J are arbitrary,
with the premise that J < J∗; but, moreover we have to explicit that n and J
condition the time spent to realize the regression, since the regression model has
complexity T (J) = n×O(2J ln(2J)) ≈ n×O(2J). From the logistic regression
we get the parameters
β0 = 3.2945,
β1 = −5.6408,
β2 = −0.8441.
and therefore the shape of the surface for the triplets (Q
(90%)
1 , Q
(75%)
2 , y) would
be similar to the one represented in ﬁgure 7. Afterwards, these parameters are
used to estimate the IDR of N = 10 portfolios target in order to compare them
with the IDR evaluated by the exact algorithm.
Alongside this we simulate N∗ = 10, 000 and N∗∗ = 100, 000 default scenar-
ios for the MC method and we estimate the IDR and the CI, as shown in the
previous paragraph.
In ﬁgure 10 are plotted the rate values y∗ obtained by the exact algorithm
and the HR model, both corresponding to theN Portfolios Target, and in table 3
are shown the obtained values compared with the CI resulting from the MC
simulations. The order of magnitude concerning execution time and accuracy
of the iterations of the HR and the MC model are not clearly comparable, since
HR is much faster, while MC is usually more accurate, especially for a great
number of MC simulations NMC . As to provide a meaningful comparison, we
have simulated 20 portfolios with dimension J∗ = 18. Figure 11 represents the
execution times in a logarithmic scale and the estimation errors that we got
by the HR method and the MC simulations for NMC = 103, 104, 105, although
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Figure 10: Histogram of the comparison between the values obtained with the exact
algorithm and the HR model.
MC for NMC = 1000 is not very signiﬁcative, but we considered it in order to
compare it with HR and have a similar order of magnitude for the error. We
point out the fact that even though the real distribution of the IDR estimated
by MC is not known, we build the order statistics in order to estimate the
probability density relying on a normal kernel function. Then the estimate of
the pdf was exploited to estimate the variance of IDRMC , and enable us to
construct the CI and compare them with the errors of the HR method.
For the purpose of comparing the expenditure in time we remark the fact
that to compute the estimation for the parameters β0, β1 and β2 it took 28
seconds, and less than a millisecond for the prediction of the IDR for each
portfolio target, i.e. by applying the HR model. Instead, the evaluation of the
IDR took approximately a minute. The computation time for the simulation
with MC depends on the dimension J∗ and on the number of simulations NMC ;
the times listed in table 4 have to be compared with the millesimal time required
by the HR model.
Moreover, increasing the dimension of the problem, the time to estimate the
IDR with the HR approach remains almost the same, indeed previously we had
seen that the computational complexity is T (J∗) ≈ n × O(2J), i.e. it depends
on the chosen regression parameters n and J , instead of J∗. On the other hand,
the time to evaluate the IDR with the exact approach of section 4.1 increases
exponentially. This is due to the fact that the computational complexity for the
exact algorithm is related to the input parameter J∗, since the mean complexity
of the best possible sort of a k-dimensional vector is O(k ln(k)), see [19, sec.
5.4, pp. 248379]. Therefore, the resulting complexity is
T (J∗) = O(2J
∗
ln(2J
∗
)) = O(2J
∗
J∗ ln(2)) ≈ O(2J∗). (15)
We have this order of computational complexity since we are using an exact al-
gorithm that sorts the vector of the 2J
∗
possible loss outcomes, then it computes
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Figure 11: Comparison between HR and MC model that puts in relation the execution
times T and the estimation errors E. The HR error is given by the absolute value of the
diﬀerence of the exact IDR and the estimated IDR, while the MC error is equal to the
width of the estimated conﬁdence interval, i.e. equal to 6.1804 σˆN . We marked with a
red circle the outliers of MC, and stress the fact that even for a MC with NMC = 104,
which is almost equal to 2J
∗
= 262144, there are chances of outliers.
Ex. IDR HR IDR Delta σˆMCN∗ CI
MC
N∗ (99.9%) σˆ
MC
N∗∗ CI
MC
N∗∗(99.9%)
59.83% 61.89% -2.06% 0.24% [59.21%, 60.69%] 0.05% [59.73%, 60.03%]
29.60% 31.58% -1.97% 0.87% [28.90%, 34.28%] 0.20% [29.53%, 30.76%]
49.76% 48.77% 0.99% 0.23% [49.20%, 50.63%] 0.06% [49.51%, 49.89%]
71.85% 73.77% -1.92% 0.15% [71.59%, 72.52%] 0.03% [71.76%, 71.95%]
34.23% 33.52% 0.71% 0.09% [33.71%, 34.26%] 0.01% [34.21%, 34.28%]
74.29% 76.09% -1.79% 0.50% [73.45%, 76.54%] 0.12% [74.02%, 74.76%]
31.93% 31.47% 0.46% 0.01% [31.90%, 31.97%] 0.004% [31.93%, 31.95%]
37.99% 36.87% 1.11% 0.54% [36.12%, 39.46%] 0.18% [37.24%, 38.35%]
59.04% 60.97% -1.92% 0.28% [58.62%, 60.11%] 0.07% [58.87%, 59.30%]
60.82% 63.36% -2.53% 0.02% [60.78%, 60.91%] 0.003% [60.82%, 60.83%]
Table 3: Table containing IDR got from the HR model and the exact algorithm for a
J∗ = 18 dimensional portfolio, where Delta = HR IDR − Exact IDR. The σˆN∗ and
σˆN∗∗ are estimated by equation (13) with N
∗ = 10, 000 and N∗∗ = 100, 000, the CI
are centered in the IDR values obtained by the MC estimation.
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J∗ MC time HR time MCtime/HRtime
15 3.83s 0.002s 1900
20 4.96s 0.004s 1250
25 5.86s 0.004s 1450
30 6.43s 0.003s 2150
40 8.64s 0.007s 1250
Table 4: Table containing the times to evaluate the IDR with the MC and HR methods
and for diﬀerent portfolio dimensions J∗ (the parameters β0, β1, β2 were estimated once
and for all). In the last column we indicate how many times the HR method results
faster than the MC method.
the CDP until it ﬁnally stops when it reaches the desired percentile.
An alternative approach for the exact algorithm is represented by the scan-
ning of the tree of cases, i.e. an algorithm that ﬁrstly computes the greatest
loss L1, and its CDP, then the second greatest loss L2 and its CDP, the third
and so on, until the percentile 0.1% is reached. But for the choice of structuring
the portfolios as shown in ﬁg.2 it is necessary to consider circa the half of all
possible combinations, and therefore it takes even more time than the previous
exact algorithm.
Let us underline that we have decided to consider J = 12 and n = 32, w.r.t.
J∗ = 18, mainly because of the computational eﬀort required by the HR and
exact method. In particular, to make the HR more eﬃcient w.r.t. the exact
calculation, i.e. with smaller computational complexity
O(HR) < O(exact),
we need n×O(2J)) < O(2J∗), hence
J∗ − log2(n) > J,
see equation (15) to what concerns the complexity of the exact algorithm. There-
fore, since n = 32 is a suﬃcient sample size, for J∗ = 18, J has to be at least
less than 14. In table 5 are shown the times spent to compute the regression
model for various J and n, these times have to be compared with the time
spent to execute the exact algorithm (in this case, with J∗ = 18, it was spent
approximately one minute, see table 1 for further cases).
The computational workﬂow. A summary Let us go back to ﬁg.8 for
a global review of the algorithm. In the application perspective, the accuracy
and the execution time are very important, but we also need to have a clear
description of the algorithm, its set-up complexity, the maintenance eﬀort and
so on.
Generally the long bank bond portfolios change quite slowly, hence the con-
centration and correlation measures between the exposures are very smoothly
over time. Hence, we can split the workﬂow in 3 diﬀerent levels. A ﬁrst level
is the general (near static) set-up, i.e. the deﬁnition of the general parameters,
such as the number of simulation N , the regression technique, the size J for the
benchmark portfolio, the α levels for Q1 and Q2, etc.
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n
J 32 64
12 29 53'
13 54 1' 56
14 1' 48 3' 37
15 3' 32 7' 17
16 7' 12 13' 50
Table 5: The time to compute the regression does not depend on the Portfolio target
P ∗, and in particular not on J∗. This table reports the times spent to compute the
regression for diﬀerent J and n. We remark the fact that the regression time is a
set-up which can be estimated once a month, and therefore since the meaningful time
for the HR method is the one reported in the third column of table 4, for high Portfolio
dimensions, the time saved is considerable.
The second level, with a periodic update, is given by the core parameters
estimation, i.e. the IDR calculation for benchmark portfolios and the parameters
(β1, β2) estimation by the regression procedures.
Finally the third level is the execution task, in other words the calculation of
the estimate IDR, given the current actual portfolio parameters and the estimate
β's.
As concerns the frequency of the above processes, the general set-up is usu-
ally triggered by any top management (risk control, risk committee) new guide-
lines or yearly. The periodic update could be run monthly or quarterly according
to the portfolio dynamics. Finally the execution process is related to the bank
regulatory constraints. If the bank has validated the internal model for the
speciﬁc market risk, e.g. following a speciﬁc solution as the one underlined in
[10] a daily calculation is usually required. Otherwise the bank can set its own
reporting frequency.
To summarize, the proposal can ﬁt quite easily the internal usual bank pro-
cedures and processes.
5 Extension to the correlated case and possible
approaches
Until now only the case with uncorrelated issuers was considered. In the previous
sections of this paper the outside-diagonal elements of the correlation matrix
were set equal zero. Although this setting is useful to be the starting point
to deal with the heuristic approaches to the IDR estimation problem, from a
ﬁnancial point of view this is unrealistic.
In the non-independent portfolio case, i.e. removing the issuers' indepen-
dence assumption, also the elements outside the diagonal are non-zero. Cor-
relations are not observable from the market, and depend on the underlying
assumptions of the assets values, such as the Black and Scholes model, from
which they can be obtained. However from a theoretical point of view the cor-
relations are estimated from the CDS spreads of the the issuers: but usually this
is impracticable also for the shortage of data. So often they are estimated from
the equity prices. Furthermore computing the IDR for dependent portfolios is
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more complex, and in particular unfeasible even for portfolios with not very
huge dimensions due to the great execution time.
Therefore our aim is to build an adequate structure to apply an HR model.
The technical problem underlying the new HR model is that we would not have
to estimate only the coeﬃcients β0, β1, β2 of the previous (uncorrelated) model,
but also all the coeﬃcients concerning the correlations between the issuers. Since
this is impracticable, we have to ﬁnd less variables that properly represent the
correlations between the issuers.
Before explaining our proposal, let us summarize what the FRTB regulations
claims for the IDR model parameters calibration. The general point is that the
high conﬁdence level for the measure, i.e. 99.9%, along with the rather long
time horizon, i.e. 1 year, does not allow for an easy IDR-back test procedure for
both the default events of the ﬁnancial instruments issuers and for the related
correlations. Practically, this is no feasible, hence in the FRTB new framework
some ﬂexibility is allowed, see [7]. In particular, we have the following main
points to be considered
• Correlations should be estimated over a 10 years periods, covering a stress
period, hence allowing to consider increases of correlations during the
ﬁnancial crisis
• Correlations must be inferred from spreads or equity prices, with some
proxies/benchmark where not available
• Banks must have clear policies and procedures that describe the correla-
tion calibration process
• Previous correlations must be based on objective data
• A bank must validate its modeling approach for such correlations, namely
it has to show that the provided internal method is appropriate for the
detained portfolio, also with respect to the chosen systematic risk factors
and associated weights
We would also like to point out the remark written by BCBS about the DRC
validation, namely Accordingly, the validation of a DRC model has to rely more
heavily on indirect methods including, but not limited to, the stress tests, sen-
sitivity analysis and scenario analysis, hence to assess both its qualitative and
quantitative eﬃciency and robustness, particularly with regard to the model's
treatment of concentrations.
To be more explicit, banks must have sound procedures and processes to
assess, build and update their models with proper documentation, even if, due
to the very challenging goal of the IDR estimation, some ﬂexibility is permitted.
We note that usually portfolios are comprised of issuers that are correlated
each other in a similar way (this feature is due to the geographic consistence
of portfolios). Therefore the outside-diagonal correlation matrix elements don't
vary very much and we can consider the mean value of them as one of the
regressors of the new HR model, let us call it σ˜. Moreover in the regression
we add the regressor D, corresponding to the index of dispersion of the outside
diagonal elements. So, for each portfolio, simultaneously to the computation of
Q
(90%)
1 and Q
(75%)
2 , obtained as concentration indexes of L and DP respectively,
we need to compute σ˜ and D.
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Therefore the new linear regression will be
y = β0 + β1Q
(90%)
1 + β2Q
(75%)
2 + β3 σ˜ + β4D + , (16)
where the dependent variable y is the normalized quantile, the intercept β0 and
the slopes βi for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the unknown parameters, the rate index Q1
and Q2, the mean correlation σ˜ and the dispersion index D are the independent
variables, and  represents the estimation error.
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